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Abstract: We propose a methodology, based on Aspect-Oriented Modeling 
(AOM), for incorporating security mechanisms in an application. The 
functionality of the application is described using the primary model and the 
attacks are specified using aspects. The attack aspect is composed with the 
primary model to obtain the misuse model. The misuse model describes 
how much the application can be compromised.  If the results are 
unacceptable, then some security mechanism must be incorporated into the 
application. The security mechanism, modeled as security aspect, is     
composed with the primary model to obtain the security treated model. The 
security treated model is analyzed to give assurance that it is resilient to the 
attack. 
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1. Introduction 
Developing secure systems is a non-trivial task. Security standards such as the 
ISO Common Criteria [28] and risk management standards such as the 
Australian/New Zealand Risk Management standards [4, 5] exist to aid secure 
systems development. However, these standards generally address system 
security in the broad sense, and often require extensive resources and expertise to 
adapt their use to the design of a specific system. These standards also do not 
address low-level details, such as, how to verify that a system is protected from 
specific kinds of attacks or how to ensure that a system has a given set of security 
properties. More importantly, they do not provide a methodology for designing 
secure systems.  
Security mechanisms are typically analyzed in isolation as protocols, and 
depending on how they are integrated in an application, they may or may not 
provide adequate protection. In addition, there are often multiple mechanisms that 
could be used to counter an attack, so choosing a mechanism that best fits design 
goals may be confusing. It is also the case that solutions to different security 
concerns may actually conflict, rendering some ineffective against the attack they 
were supposed to counter. System designers need a way to verify the efficacy of 
security mechanisms once they have been integrated into an application design, 
prior to implementation. They also need the ability to include solutions in 
combination and analyze them against various attacks. In this paper, we propose 
such a methodology for designing secure applications.  
We use aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) techniques [20] in our approach to 
designing secure systems. Complex software is not developed as a monolithic unit 
but is decomposed into modules on the basis of functionality. We refer to the 
models describing functionality as the primary model. Security concerns are not 
limited to one module of the primary model but impacts several of them. For 
example, an attack typically affects multiple modules. Similarly, a security 
mechanism that thwarts an attack will have to be incorporated in several modules 
of the application. The attack and the security mechanisms are localized in a 
separate model, which we call the aspect. Modeling security mechanisms and 
attack models as aspects has several benefits -- it allows designers to understand 
the attacks and the mechanisms independently, which makes it easier to manage 
and change these models. Designers can use techniques for composing aspects 
with the primary model, followed by analysis of the resulting system, to 
understand the effect of the attack or the effect of the security mechanism on the 
application. Another advantage is that analyzing using different attack models or 
different security aspects is easier since all a designer must do is to re-compose 
   Page 2  
the primary model with a new attack model or new security aspect prior to 
performing a new analysis. 
An aspect in our work is similar to the concept of aspects used in other AOM 
or AOP (Aspect Oriented Programming) approaches [2, 13, 14, 31, 34, 57] in that 
they represent a non-functional concern, e.g. security, and they are cross cutting 
and must be integrated at different places in the primary model. The differences 
lie in how the aspects are specified, whether they are reusable, and the manner in 
which the aspects are integrated with the application. 
We define two types of aspects: generic aspects and context-specific aspects. 
Generic aspects are application-independent and reusable. For instance, an attack 
pattern can be represented as a generic aspect. Similarly, a security protocol or a 
security mechanism can be modeled as a generic aspect. An application developer 
can create his own generic aspect or use an existing one from the library of 
generic aspects. Generic aspects can be independently analyzed to ensure that the 
properties of the attack or the mechanism have been adequately captured.   
Generic aspects must be instantiated in the context of a given application. The 
instantiation is referred to as a context-specific aspect. We use parameterized 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) to represent generic aspects. Context specific 
aspects are represented as UML models. The instantiation occurs by binding 
parameters in the generic aspect to elements in the primary model. Specifying 
aspects using UML allows our approach to be used at different levels of 
abstraction. 
To understand the impact of a security attack on the primary model, it is 
necessary to compose the context-specific attack aspect with the primary model. 
The composition produces the misuse model. Analysis of the misuse model will 
help determine whether the protected resources are compromised by the attack. If 
the results are unacceptable, a security mechanism must be integrated with the 
primary model. We refer to this model as the security treated  model. To 
understand the efficacy of the security mechanism, the security treated model is 
composed with the context-specific attack aspect. The result is the security treated 
misuse model. The security treated misuse model is analyzed to ensure that the 
given attack is mitigated in the security treated model. 
Manual analysis is error-prone and tedious. Towards this end, we investigated 
how this analysis can be partially automated. The tools for verifying UML 
models, such as, OCLE [47] and USE [25], are useful when we want to check if a 
specific model instance conforms to the constraints of the model. Although 
theorem provers are effective for analyzing properties, but they require a lot of 
expertise and are unlikely to be used by application developers. We chose to use 
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the Alloy Analyzer because it is easy to use and has been used for verifying many 
real-world applications. 
We illustrate the basic operation of our approach using an example e-
commerce platform called ACTIVE [17]. ACTIVE provides services for 
electronic purchasing of goods over the Internet. The IST EU-project CORAS 
performed three risk assessments of ACTIVE in the period 2000-2003. The 
project looked into security risks of the user authentication mechanism, secure 
payment mechanism, and the agent negotiation mechanisms of ACTIVE. Our 
example consists of the user authentication mechanism of ACTIVE’s login 
service. In order to keep the example tractable, we only show how to apply our 
methodology to one of its risks and one of the possible treatments for that risk.  
The paper makes several contributions. First, it provides a methodology for 
designing secure applications. Second, it shows how to analyze the impact of a 
security attack on an application and how effective the security solutions are 
against a given attack. Third, it allows one to compare the efficacies of the 
different security solutions with respect to one or more given attacks. Fourth, it 
shows how to formally analyze a model and get assurance about the security 
properties. Fifth, it demonstrates feasibility that the approach can be used for real-
world applications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes ACTIVE. 
Section 3 shows an example attack to the login service.  We also show how to 
compose the attack model with the primary model to create a misuse model. 
Section 4 presents a security mechanism we use to prevent the attack and 
illustrates how we integrate it with the primary model to create a security treated 
model. This section also shows how we generate the misuse model for the 
security treated model. Section 5 shows how we can analyze this model to ensure 
the satisfaction of the security properties.  Section 6 discusses related work. 
Section 7 concludes the paper with some pointers to future directions. The 
Appendix gives the detailed Alloy models. 
 
2. Overview of Our Approach 
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Figure 1. Secure system design methodology. 
An overview of our methodology is given in Figure 1. Step (1) analyzes the 
system to identify the threats to the resources. The inputs to this step are the 
primary model, possible threats, and the security requirements. Threats become 
attacks on the system when they compromise protected resources. Since an attack 
impacts various parts of the primary model, we abstract the specification of the 
attack in an aspect. To distinguish them from the other aspects used in our work, 
we refer to them as attack aspects. Step (2) involves composing the attack aspects 
with the primary model to create misuse models. Step (3) analyzes the misuse 
model to understand the impact of the attack. If the results are not acceptable, 
potential security solutions (or mechanisms) that counter the attack are 
incorporated into the primary model to obtain the security-treated model.  The 
security-treated model is combined with the specific attack to create a security-
treated misuse model. This is done in Step 4. The security-treated misuse model is 
analyzed as in Step (3), and if the results are still unacceptable, an alternate 
security solution must be integrated, and the new security-treated system misuse 
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model re-generated and re-analyzed. When the analysis results are acceptable, a 
different attack and its potential solutions can be considered. This is done in Step 
(5). It is important to continue integrating security mechanisms and analyzing the 
resulting security-treated system against previously considered attack models 
since some mechanisms may interfere with each other. When such conflicts arise, 
the designer can integrate alternative solutions until a usable combination is 
identified through achieving acceptable analysis results. We next discuss each 
step of the methodology in more details. 
Step 1: Analyze system risk. 
There are many different risk analyses methodologies that can be used in the 
first step of the methodology, and we use the CORAS framework [15, 17, 49]. 
CORAS is model-based, and uses UML diagrams and textual usage scenarios as 
part of a risk assessment. This fits well with existing design processes since UML 
is the de-facto modeling language used in the software industry. CORAS takes 
advantage of techniques developed for the safety domain, and has a platform of 
supporting tools. Using CORAS, a portion of the system to be analyzed is 
identified as the context for the analysis, and assets associated with particular 
stakeholders are identified within that context. UML use case, static class, and 
dynamic behavior diagrams are used to specify the system design that we refer to 
as the primary model.  
The CORAS framework use Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis to 
identify threats to the assets of interest, and Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) to identify system vulnerabilities. It then uses Fault Tree Analysis, along 
with the threats and vulnerability analysis results to identify unwanted incidents 
that can lead to attacks on assets. The consequences and frequencies of these 
incidents determine the value of the risks with which they are associated. 
Designers prioritize risks with respect to the system security requirements, and 
assess potential treatments using these priorities and the risk values. 
This detailed assessment identifies the context in which specific attacks could 
occur and the assets that could be affected. Part of the output of a CORAS 
analysis is therefore the exact locations in the system design that are vulnerable to 
attacks and the exact forms that such attacks would take. This information is used 
in Steps 2 and 4 of our methodology. 
Designers identify treatments that can: 1) reduce the frequency of an unwanted 
incident, 2) reduce its consequences, 3) transfer the risk elsewhere, or 4) leave the 
risk unaffected. Potential treatments, like threats, are developed from a variety of 
sources, including experience, domain expertise, and governmental sources. 
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Treatments may take the form of incorporating an existing well-defined 
mechanism (e.g. SSL in web applications), or they may take the form of “good 
practices” such as proper quoting of input values to remove the possibility of 
database attacks in form-based web/database applications.  The process of 
identifying threats and developing treatments is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however we do note that our methodology relies upon prior knowledge of 
potential threats, and we cannot discover previously unknown threats using these 
techniques. 
 Our methodology uses the output of the CORAS process in two ways: 1) we 
use UML to model unwanted incidents leading to high priority risks in what we 
call attack models, and 2) we use UML to model potential treatments to create 
security aspects. Both types of models consist of diagrams such as use cases, 
static, and dynamic diagrams. We add constraints written in the Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) to specify security properties. (OCL [44] is based on set theory 
and logic.) 
Step 2: Generate misuse model. 
The second step in our methodology is to generate a misuse model. We create 
this model by instantiating a generic attack model (defined in the risk analysis 
step), and composing it with the primary model. The misuse model represents the 
system under the specific attack, and illustrates the degree to which the 
application can be compromised by the given attack. Please note that this model 
could also be a direct output of the CORAS analysis since system attacks are 
assessed in the context of the system. We describe creation from a generic model 
to make clear that other risk assessment techniques that do not directly produce 
system-specify attack models can also be used with our methodology. 
Step 3: Analyze misuse model. 
We analyze the misuse model and compare the analysis results with the 
security requirements to determine whether the risk leading to the misuse is 
adequately mitigated by the system. Since the misuse model contains OCL 
constraints, rigorous formal analysis is possible. Theorem provers, model 
checkers, and executable models can be used to analyze dynamic behavior. In this 
paper, we use the Alloy Analyzer for the purpose of analyzing the models.  
Analysis can demonstrate that the original functional design sufficiently 
protects system assets. If this is the case, a designer can compose a different 
attack model with the primary model to create a new misuse model ready for 
analysis. More often, however, the misuse model analysis results are 
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unacceptable, and a security mechanism must be incorporated into the system to 
mitigate the risk to its assets. 
Step 4: Generate security-treated system misuse model. 
We compose potential treatments with the primary model to create a security-
treated system model. This model specifies the system in which the security 
mechanism has been incorporated. Instantiation of the generic security aspect and 
composition with the primary model use the same techniques as described above. 
(As mentioned in Step 2, the system-specific security aspect model could be a 
direct output of Step 1.) We compose the attack model with this new system 
model to create the security-treated system misuse model. We then analyze this 
model just as the original misuse model was analyzed, and we use the results to 
give assurance that the application is indeed resilient to the given attack.  
Step 5: Analyze alternative solution or consider different attack. 
If the analysis results of the security-treated system misuse model are 
unacceptable, designers can incorporate a different security mechanism into the 
system, creating a new security-treated system model. This model can then 
composed with the attack model and analyzed. If the results are acceptable, 
designers can analyze the security-treated system model with respect to a different 
attack, incorporating new security mechanisms to mitigate additional risks. Once 
a solution is found to a new attack, designers should analyze the new security-
treated system incorporating the previous attack to provide assurance that the 
multiple solutions do not interfere with each other, rendering one or the other 
ineffective. 
In an ideal situation, we could automate our entire design methodology. This is 
particularly attractive since repeated generic aspect instantiation, composition, 
and analysis can be tedious and error prone. While we have been unable to 
automate the methodology completely, we have automated certain parts, and 
identified others that can be partially automated. We discuss automation in the 
context of our example, and give further details as to on-going work in this area in 
our conclusions. 
3. Example E-Commerce System 
We illustrate the reasoning about security risk mitigation with the login service 
of the ACTIVE e-commerce platform This example concentrates on the result 
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from the CORAS project risk assessment of the user authentication mechanism of 
the login service. 
We begin by creating a primary model of the login service. This model consists 
of both static (structural) and dynamic (behavioral) diagrams. Several classes play 
a part in the login process. A user who wishes to login to the e-commerce system 
must run an ActiveClient  in a web browser on his or her local machine. The 
browser communicates with a LoginManager class that is located on a server 
across the Internet. 
The  LoginManager has several related classes. An account manager 
(UAcctManager) authenticates users using a simple user name and password 
provided by the client web browser. A profile manager (UProfileManager) keeps 
track of user profile information. The login service static and sequence diagrams 
are shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Primary model (E-commerce login service) static and sequence diagrams  
The login operation proceeds as follows. First, a user, through a web browser 
(ActiveClient), requests a login page from the e-commerce system by sending 
requestLoginPage  to  LoginManager.  LoginManager  responds with loginPage. 
The user enters a unique user name (uname) and password (pword), and this 
information is sent to LoginManager. The server then sends validate message to 
UAcctManager. The UAcctManager returns account information (acct), or NULL 
if the user account does not exist. 
If the user is authenticated (i.e. a non-NULL acct is returned), the 
LoginManager  sends a getUProfile  message to UProfileManager. The 
UProfileManager  retrieves the user's profile (prof)  and sends it to the 
LoginManager. Using this information the LoginManager creates an appropriate 
home page which is returned to the user's web browser. If the user could not be 
authenticated, or the user's profile could not be obtained, a visitor page is returned 
to the browser.  
The asset that needs to be protected in this system is the user information, 
specifically the information in a registered user’s profile, which is returned in the 
homePage, and which is accessible anytime after a registered user has 
successfully logged into the ACTIVE system. 
4. The Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
The risk assessments performed as part of the CORAS project identified the login 
process as being vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. During this kind of 
attack, user information can be obtained directly, or an attacker can intercept user 
names and passwords, to be used at later times to impersonate a valid user. 
Attacks can be thought of as aspects because an attack is not confined to one 
specific module of the application, but impacts multiple modules. We represent 
these attacks as generic aspects. We represent generic aspects as patterns using 
UML templates. These templates must be instantiated for each application to 
obtain a context-specific attack model. 
In this section, we show how to represent the man-in-the-middle attack as a 
generic aspect. Messages between a requestor and authenticator are intercepted 
by an attacker. This can only occur if all messages flow through the attacker and 
not through a direct association between the requestor and authenticator. The 
attacker either intercepts the message intended for the authenticator, or the 
attacker eavesdrops on the communication medium between the requestor and the 
authenticator.  
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In interception, the attacker must pose as the authenticator so that any message 
intended for the authenticator is really sent to the attacker. The attacker then 
relays messages between the requestor and the authenticator until the private 
information has been obtained by the attacker. Messages can either be passed on 
unchanged (passive attack), or the attacker can change messages prior to sending 
them onto the intended recipient (active attack). 
In eavesdropping, the attacker does not impersonate the authenticator, but 
rather just listens to the message flow. The attacker may not obtain all of the 
messages flowing between the requestor and authenticator, but simply sample 
messages in the hopes of obtaining information. We use the active form of 
interception in our example, where an attacker can actually participate in complex 
protocols, and change messages if desired before passing them on to the requestor 
or authenticator. The static and sequence diagrams of a generic man-in-the-middle 
authentication attack model is shown in Figure 3.  
The static diagram shows four classes. The |Requestor communicates with the 
|Authenticator, which uses the help of an authentication helper class, |AuthHelper 
to authenticate the requestor. The communication in both directions passes 
through an |Attacker. The ‘X’ on the ‘|requestDirect’ relation indicates that a 
direct relationship between the |Requestor and |Authenticator classes is forbidden, 
and if it exists in a primary model with which this aspect is composed, it will be 
removed. 
The sequence diagram shows all messages between the |Requestor and 
|Authenticator passing through the |Attacker. Secret information can be changed 
by the |Attacker as shown by the |checkSecretInfo message from the |Requestor to 
the |Attacker, and the |checkSecretInfoAt message passed on to the |Authenticator. 
This generic aspect must be instantiated to create a context-specific aspect that can 
then be composed with the primary model to create a misuse model.  
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Figure 3. Generic man-in-the-middle attack model static and sequence diagrams.  
4.1. Generating the Misuse Model 
In order to understand the impact the man-in-the-middle attack has on the e-
commerce application, we need to generate a misuse model. The misuse model 
will indicate how much the primary model can be compromised by the attack. 
Two steps are needed to generate the misuse model: 
1.  Instantiate the generic attack aspect to obtain the context-specific attack 
aspect. 
2.  Compose the context specific attack aspect with the primary model to 
obtain the misuse model. 
Details on instantiation and composition may be found in France et al. [19, 20]. 
The steps outlined below are intended to provide an overview of the process. 
Instantiating the Generic Aspect: The generic aspect shown in Figure 3 is 
application-independent. It is specified using UML templates. These templates 
must be instantiated for a given application to create a context-specific aspect. 
Instantiation consists of several steps: 1) determining model element 
correspondence, 2) creating a binding list, and 3) stamping out aspect template 
elements using the binding list to create model elements.  
Any element in the generic aspect model that has a name beginning with the ‘|’ 
character is a template parameter and can correspond to an element in the primary 
model that is of the same construct type. For example, in Figure 3 the ‘|Requestor’ 
lifeline parameter in the sequence diagram can correspond to the ‘ActiveClient’ 
lifeline in the primary model since they are the same construct types (lifelines). 
Determining element correspondence is a human-involved task. A designer 
must determine “where” the generic aspect needs to be integrated into the primary 
model, and thus, which primary model elements correspond to which aspect 
parameters. Hints, such as identical primary model and template parameter 
element names or recognizing patterns in the two models, can be useful in this 
process, but ultimately a human must decide what parameters correspond to 
primary model elements. Correspondence is formalized by binding primary model 
element names to template parameters during aspect instantiation. We call the set 
of corresponding elements the binding list. It consists of pairs of element names 
of the form (<template parameter name>, <primary model element name>), for 
example (|Requestor, ActiveClient). Often there are parameters in a generic aspect 
that do not correspond to elements in the primary model. Thus, the binding list 
must be completed by including bindings for the rest of the aspect parameters, 
using names in the generic aspect with the leading ‘|’ character removed. An 
example is (|clientIntersept, clientIntercept).  
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If the CORAS framework is used to perform risk analysis, locations in the 
primary model where an attack could occur have been identified, and hence 
bindings to the primary model are also identified. In fact, a complete context-
specific attack model can be created from this information as part of the risk 
analysis step. 
The context-specific aspect pattern is then automatically constructed, creating 
all the elements in the generic aspect model, and substituting the aspect parameter 
names with their bound names from the binding list, and using the generic aspect 
model names for the rest of the model elements in the generic aspect. Examples of 
aspect templates that will simply be stamped out upon instantiation are shown in 
Figure 6, in the form of most of the messages comprising the TLS protocol – 
these messages do not contain any parameters. The context-specific aspect 
diagrams of the man-in-the-middle attack are shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Context-specific man-in-the-middle attack model static and sequence diagrams.  
Obtaining the misuse model: The context specific aspect is composed with 
the primary model to obtain the misuse model. The composed static diagram is 
shown in Figure 5, and the composed sequence diagram is shown in Figure 6. The 
first step is to compose the class diagrams of the attack and primary models.  
Class diagram model elements are composed based on their construct type and 
“signature”. The signature can be simply defined as the name of the element, or it 
can be defined in more detail, such as a class name, attributes, and methods 
(perhaps including argument names and types). Composition proceeds by finding 
elements of the same construct type, with matching signatures in each model and 
then composing them. Our default algorithm is to simply add model elements that 
exist in one model or the other, but not both, in the composed model. Another 
default is to replace elements in the primary model with matching elements in the 
aspect model. Both default actions can be overridden using composition 
directives. The presence of an element in the primary model with a matching 
aspect model element marked for deletion (for example, the requestLine relation 
between ActiveClient and LoginManager in the context-specific aspect model of 
Figure 4) results in the element being deleted from the composition. Composition 
proceeds through all the elements of the class diagram. There are default actions 
to handle simple conflicts (e.g. different multiplicities in a relation), which can be 
overridden using composition directives.  
Composition of the sequence diagram occurs in a similar fashion, based on 
matching construct types and their attributes, including name. Stereotypes are 
used to direct the addition (or deletion) of model elements into the composed 
sequence. The algorithm defaults again to replacing matching elements in the 
primary model with their counterparts from the aspect. Composition directives 
can be used to modify this behavior. Please see our previous work [20, 50] for 
details on composition. 
Model composition is a largely automated task. A human need only be 
involved to re-direct composition behavior from algorithm defaults, if this is 
needed, or to decide how to resolve conflicts that cannot be handled by algorithm 
defaults. An example of such a situation occurs when a composition results in the 
deletion of an attribute that is needed by another class. To identify such conflicts, 
a tool must employ various dependency tracing mechanisms. To resolve the 
conflict though, a human must decide whether to reinstate the attribute, the 
dependency by moving the location of the data contained in the attribute, or make 
other changes to eliminate the need for this information.  
The misuse class diagram (Figure 5) differs from the primary model class 
diagram in the following ways: (i) an Attacker class is added, (ii) an association 
between Attacker and ActiveClient is added, (iii) an association between Attacker 
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and LoginManager is added, and (iv) direct association between the ActiveClient 
and LoginManager is deleted because all communications now go through the 
attacker class. The composed sequence diagram (Figure 6) shows the addition of 
the Attacker lifeline, and the fact that all communication between ActiveClient 
and LoginManager flows through Attacker. This sequence diagram will be used 
to illustrate how much the primary model can be compromised by a man-in-the-
middle attack.  
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Figure 5. Misuse model (composed primary and man-in-the-middle) class diagram  
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Figure 6.  Misuse model (composed primary and man-in-the-middle) sequence diagram  
4.2. Evaluating the Impact of an Attack on the Application 
Informally, we can reason about the misuse diagram as follows. First, the 
security properties that should be present are that: 1) Attacker should not receive 
uname and pword and 2) Attacker should not receive homePage.  However, the 
sequence clearly shows that the attacker obtains the login name and password of a 
registered user, which can be used at a later time to impersonate the registered 
user, and the attacker also receives a homePage, if one is sent. The ability of the 
attacker to extract these secrets can be also formally analyzed using techniques 
developed by Jürjens [32] or Alloy Analyzer [1, 30], which we use later in this 
paper. 
To counter a man-in-the-middle attack, authentication and confidentiality 
mechanisms must be incorporated into the login service. The mechanism that we 
choose is Transport Layer Security (TLS) [51]. We chose to use TLS since it is a 
follow-on to SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) [52], which is a commonly available 
authentication mechanism used in web applications. Other mechanisms could also 
be used to provide a stronger authentication mechanism for the service, including 
proprietary schemes developed for particular applications. The only requirement 
for use with our methodology is that the mechanism be specified as a UML model 
(using static and behavioral diagrams), and that it be specified at a similar level of 
abstraction as the functional system design primary model. 
5. Incorporating TLS Authentication in the Application 
The security properties of authentication and confidentiality are both at risk with 
the man-in-the-middle attack, so mechanisms that address authentication and 
confidentiality are potential risk treatments. We demonstrate the use of TLS to 
mitigate the man-in-the-middle attack risk. TLS is based on passing certificates 
between a client and server for authentication purposes, and to establish secret 
session keys for the encryption of all subsequent messages. In this paper, we use a 
variant of TLS described by Jürjens [32]. The sequence of the TLS mechanism is 
shown as a generic aspect diagram in Figure 7. (The class diagram for TLS is 
quite simple, consisting of only two classes, |Client and |Server, and the methods 
and attributes used in the sequence diagram. It is not included in this paper.) 
The TLS generic aspect contains two classes: |Client and |Server. Certificates 
shown in Figure 7 (i.e. sCert and cCert) are data that contain a name, e.g. server 
name or user name, and the public key associated with that name. They are signed 
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by an authority. Signing is essentially an encryption of the certificate with the 
authority’s private key. As a guide to understanding the sequence diagram, the 
first argument of the extractKey, extractName, sign, encrypt, and decrypt methods 
is the key that is used to perform the operation, and the second argument is the 
data element from which information is to be extracted. For example, the method 
call  sPublicKey=extractKey(caPubKey,sCert) indicates that the server’s public 
key, sPublicKey, is to be extracted from the certificate authority signed server 
certificate, sCert, using the certificate authority’s public key, caPubKey. For the 
purposes of this example, certificate creation and all public and private keys are 
assumed to be obtained in a secure manner. The client must have the certificate 
authority’s (CA) public key, and the server must have a certificate, signed by the 
certificate authority, of its name and public key. Other assumptions include the 
fact that both unique identifier numbers called nonces, and session keys must 
change each time the protocol is initiated. 
A TLS sequence begins with |Client sending an init message that contains a 
nonce (iNonce), its public key (cPublicKey), and its certificate (cCert). When 
|Server receives this message, it extracts the public key using the client’s public 
key sent in the message, and the client user name. It checks that the public key in 
the signed portion of the message is the same as the public key sent in the 
unsigned portion of the message. If not, the TLS authentication is aborted. 
If the client public keys match, |Server creates a message containing the 
session key that needs to be used for encryption once the connection is complete, 
the nonce received in the original client message, and the client public key 
extracted from the client certificate. This message is then signed using |Server’s 
private key. This signed message is then encrypted using |Client’s public key. The 
result, along with |Server’s certificate (which is signed by a trusted certificate 
authority) is sent to |Client.  
|Client first extracts the server public key from the certificate, using the 
certificate authority’s public key. It then extracts the server name from the 
certificate. If the name of the server in the certificate (recName) matches the name 
of the server (sName) to which the original init message was sent, the protocol 
proceeds. Otherwise |Client aborts the authentication. The encrypted portion of 
the message is decrypted using |Client’s private key (cPrivateKey), and the items 
in the resulting signed message are extracted using |Server’s public key (using the 
methods getKey, getNonce, and getPkey). The received nonce value (reciNonce) 
is compared to the nonce originally sent by the client (iNonce). If it does not 
match, this indicates that an attack on the communication has occurred, and 
|Client aborts the operation. If the items match, another check is made against the 
received client public key (recPubKey) and |Client’s internal public key 
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(cPublicKey). If these items match, then the communication path is secure, and 
|Client can encrypt its secrets using the session key and transmit them to |Server. 
|Client therefore encrypts a continue message of some sort (|contL) and sends it to 
|Server.  
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Figure 7.  Generic TLS aspect sequence diagram 
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5.1. Generating the Security-Treated Model 
The TLS mechanism model can be composed with the e-commerce model in 
Figure 2 in order to create a security-treated model that incorporates TLS 
capabilities. The TLS generic model is first instantiated as a context-specific 
model using bindings defined between it and the primary model, as described 
previously in Section 4.1. Similar to creating the context-specific attack model, a 
context-specific security aspect model may be a direct output of the risk analysis 
step of our methodology. If not, the bindings needed to create a context-specific 
model will be an output of the analysis, and these can be used to automatically 
create the context-specify aspect model. The context-specific models are the 
composed. The resulting composed static diagram is shown in Figure 8, and the 
composed sequence diagram is shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 8. Security-treated static diagram  
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Figure 9.  Security-treated sequence diagram   
The sequence shown in Figure 9 begins as the sequence did in Figure 2, with 
the  ActiveClient requesting a login page from the LoginManager. The 
LoginManager responds with loginPage. Now the TLS sequence is inserted; 
instead of ActiveClient sending a login message with a user name (uname) and 
password (pword), a different login message is sent. This new login message 
contains a nonce, the user’s public key, and certificate. The logic for the TLS 
handshake continues as in the TLS aspect model, with model element name 
changes per the bindings discussed above. Once the TLS handshake completes 
successfully, the ActiveClient sends a continue message to LoginManager, which 
in turns causes the LoginManager to get personal profile information (if it exists), 
and send a homePage back to the user via ActiveClient. If the profile information 
does not exist, a visitorPage is sent back to the user.  
5.2.  Creating the Security-Treated Misuse Model  
Once security mechanisms have been incorporated into a primary model, we need 
to verify whether the given attack is prevented in this new model. In our example, 
we need to determine whether the TLS authentication adequately protects the 
login service from the man-in-the-middle attack. We can reason about the 
effective security after composing the man-in-the-middle aspect with the security 
treated primary model and analyzing it for desired security properties.  
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Figure 10.  Misuse model (security treated model + man-in-the-middle) sequence diagram  
Figure 10 shows the detailed sequence when the man-in-the-middle attack is 
composed with the system protected by TLS. The attacker in this sequence is 
active, that is, Attacker changes messages flowing between ActiveClient and 
LoginManager. The first message that is changed is the login message, where the 
attacker creates a certificate with its own public key and ActiveClient’s user name. 
Thus, LoginManager has a valid user name, but the attacker’s public key, so that 
any messages from LoginManager that have been encrypted using the “client” 
public key are actually encrypted with the attacker’s public key. This encryption 
means that the attacker can decrypt them using its private key. When 
LoginManager sends back the message with the session key in it, Attacker 
decrypts it using its private key, and re-encrypts it using the real ActiveClient 
public key.  
5.3. Analyzing the Security-Treated Misuse Model 
Recall that the original threat posed by the man-in-the-middle attack is to 
obtain user information, as returned in a home page. In the original system this 
occurs when the attacker obtains a user name and password, followed by a 
homePage. The receipt of the homePage indicates that the user is registered, and 
the fact that the attacker has the user name and password means that these items 
can be used later to obtain more user information. 
The addition of TLS to the login sequence changes the situation. First, the user 
name/password scheme no longer exists, so the attacker cannot simply eavesdrop 
to obtain information that can later be used to gain access to the system. 
Eavesdropping also will not work to obtain registered user information from a 
homePage, since all communication between LoginManager and ActiveClient is 
encrypted using a session key once the TLS authenticates ActiveClient. A 
successful attack can only occur if the TLS protocol is successful (i.e. a 
homePage or visitorPage is sent to ActiveClient from LoginManager), and 
Attacker obtains the session key.  
Therefore the security property that needs to be preserved in the security-
treated misuse sequence is that if the protocol succeeds, Attacker must not obtain 
the session key of the LoginManager and ActiveClient.  
This property can be validated using either informal or formal methods. The 
next section presents the use of Alloy Analyzer to formally validate it. Here we 
reason informally about the effective security provided by TLS as follows. Since 
the public key in the login message is the same as in the certificate, the first test 
comparison in LoginManager will work. Next LoginManager creates a signed 
message (with its private key) containing the attacker’s public key, received 
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nonce value, and session key, and encrypts it using that same public key. This 
message and LoginManager’s certificate are sent to the attacker, which decrypts 
the signed message with its private key and can extract items from the signed 
message using LoginManager’s public key as contained in its certificate. The 
signed message from the server is then encrypted with the ActiveClient public 
key, and is sent to the ActiveClient, along with the server’s certificate. Note that 
the signed message itself cannot be changed since the attacker does not have the 
LoginManager’s private key. Also, a new signed message created with Attacker’s 
private key cannot be created since the certificate included in the message to 
ActiveClient would have to contain the LoginManager server name and Attacker 
public key and be signed from a trusted certificate authority. This is required so 
that the certificate authority public key possessed by ActiveClient can be used to 
obtain the “server” public key. 
ActiveClient first extracts the server name and public key from the certificate 
using the CA public key. A comparison is made between the server name the 
ActiveClient has and the server name in the certificate. This test will work. Next, 
the ActiveClient decrypts the signed message from the LoginManager using its 
private key to obtain the session key and nonce value. It then compares the 
message nonce included in that message with the one it originally sent, and this 
test will also work. Next the client public key included in that message is 
extracted, and compared with its own public key. This test will fail because the 
client key included in the signed message from LoginManager is that of the 
attacker. Therefore the sequence will always move to the third test failure 
alternative where the abortLoginAttempt message will be returned to the user of 
ActiveClient and the sequence ends. Thus, the treatment prevents the attack, and 
consequently the undesirable properties it allows, from occurring.  
6. Formally Verifying Authentication Properties in the Misuse Model  
The form of informal analysis shown in the previous section is error prone and 
tedious. Towards this end, we show how such analysis can be done formally with 
the help of automated tools. We use the Alloy Analyzer to formally reason about 
the misuse model sequence shown in Figure 10 and the ability of TLS to protect 
the system from a man-in-the-middle attack. In the following sections we explain 
how the Alloy Analyzer can be used to verify that the desired security properties 
do indeed hold. 
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6.1. Alloy 
Alloy [30] is a fully declarative first-order logic language that can be used to 
model complex software. An Alloy model consists of a number of signatures and 
relation declarations. A signature denotes a set of atoms, which are the basic 
entities of models. Relations are sets of tuples of atoms capturing the relationships 
between entities.  
Alloy comes with an accompanying analyzer that is a fully automatic constraint 
solver. The analyzer operates on implications, for example that a system modeled 
in Alloy implies a particular property. This assertion is negated, and then 
translated into a Boolean expression. The analyzer uses a SAT solver to search for 
a model of the negated assertion. A user-specified scope on model elements 
bounds the domain, making the problem finite. This makes it possible to create a 
Boolean formula for the SAT solver. If a model is found that fits the negated 
assertion, this means the original implication has a counterexample and is not 
valid. If no counterexample is found, the original implication may still not be 
valid since the search was bounded by the user-defined scope. However, if a large 
scope is used, this situation can be made unlikely.  
The Alloy Analyzer differs from theorem provers in this sense – if a 
counterexample is found, the implication is false, but if no counterexample is 
found the implication is still not necessarily true. The analyzer differs from model 
checkers in that it finds models of logical formulas whereas model checkers check 
that a state machine is a mathematical model of a temporal logic formula. Please 
see the Alloy website for more information on the language and analyzer [1]. 
6.2. Analyzing the Misuse Model for Security Properties 
There are two steps involved in analyzing the misuse model in Figure 10 for 
security properties using the Alloy Analyzer. The first is to simplify the model to 
remove non-essential elements so that the translation to Alloy produces a model 
with only the items necessary to reason about the security properties. The second 
is to translate the UML model to Alloy using the UML2Alloy tool, as described 
by Bordbar and Anastasakis [8, 9, 54].  
The UML2Alloy tool requires that the model be presented as a class diagram, 
accompanied with OCL specifications of method behavior. Both of these can be 
derived from the misuse sequence diagram of Figure 10. The class diagram must 
be complete in that it contains all attributes and their types, along with complete 
method signatures.  
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6.3. Creating an Abstracted OCL Specification 
Abstracting the security-treated misuse model to exclude unused details cannot 
be fully automated. While portions of the task may be automated (noted in the 
discussion below), a set of heuristics guiding a human designer was used to create 
the results in this paper. These heuristics are as follows.  
1.  A designer must decide what assertions will be tested using Alloy 
Analyzer. For this example, we need to ensure that: 
(a)  if the protocol succeeds, Attacker does not have the session key  
The formulation of this assertion is influenced by Alloy Analyzer since the tool 
works by attempting to find a counterexample to the assertion. Formulating the 
assertion as in (a) means that the tool needs to search for a case where the 
protocol succeeds, and the attacker knows the session key. An alternative 
formulation, that if the attacker knows the session key, then the protocol should 
abort is harder to test since there are several reasons why the protocol might abort, 
besides the attacker gaining access to the session key.   
2.  Every message to a different object lifeline has the potential to become a 
method in the OCL specification of the receiving object, if the object 
performs some computation of interest as a result of receiving the message. 
If the receiving object just passes the message through to another object 
lifeline, the method will exist in the final receiving object. In order to 
support this heuristic, it is easiest to construct a message list, including 
sending and receiving object names. Since messages always exist between 
at most two object lifelines, this list can be created automatically. Messages 
that are the result of invoking methods in the same object are not included. 
3.  Every alt box in the sequence diagram of the misuse model represents an 
if-then-else OCL constraint in the specification, so the next step is to 
identify each of these tests, and identify the variable dependencies that 
exist in them. For example, the first alt box in Figure 10 has a guard of [res 
= True]. The variable res is set as a result of the comparison of aPublicKey 
and cKey. The cKey variable is obtained by extracting the public key from 
the certificate, aCert. The aPublicKey variable is an argument in the login 
method message. The res variable thus depends on aPublicKey in the login 
message,  cKey, and therefore aCert in the login message. Similar 
dependencies must be identified for each test of each alt box.  
After this step is complete, messages that do not affect these variables are 
removed from the message list. This step removes the requestLoginPage and 
loginPage messages. Classes that are not involved in the remaining messages can 
also be removed. Messages involving the conditions that will be tested with Alloy 
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Analyzer need to be retained. In the case of our example, this means that the 
messages involving returning a web page to ActiveClient need to be retained. We 
will also have to have some way to tell that the protocol has not aborted, in this 
case we choose a simple Boolean variable, loginAborted. This variable will be 
used in step 5, below. 
A further simplification that needs to occur is to replace variables that are 
hierarchical with their constituent parts, discarding parts that are not needed. For 
example, certificates contain many things, but all we care about in this example is 
the name of the certificate owner and the public key. We make this simplification 
for the ActiveClient,  Attacker, and LoginManager certificates. Similarly, the 
messages sent between ActiveClient, Attacker, and LoginManager have names 
like sMess, aSMess, and cMess. These are hierarchical variables, so we replace 
them with the variables that we identified in the alt box dependency development. 
The next steps create the OCL specifications of methods used in the 
UML2Alloy transformation. 
4.  Classes are specified with methods named for the messages received by the 
class. For example, Attacker has a method called recLoginFromAC 
(corresponding to the login() message sent from ActiveClient to 
LoginManager, but intercepted by Attacker, which changes it and forwards 
it onto LoginManager).  ActiveClient has a method called 
abortLoginAttempt that corresponds to the abortLoginAttempt messages 
from  LoginManager to ActiveClient (via Attacker, which simply passes 
them through). A method called main must be added prior to the first 
method, to start the scenario during analysis. This method is added to 
ActiveClient in our example, and the last thing this method does is to 
invoke recLoginFromAC in Attacker. Variables that are used in the callee 
method need to be set next. So for example, in Figure 12, the OCL 
specification of the main method is shown, and this includes setting the 
initial nonce value, the server name, the client name, and then invoking the 
recLoginFromAC method. 
5.  Any  alt boxes that appear in the sequence diagram after a message 
corresponding to a method call in the OCL specification, but before any 
other messages corresponding to method calls, will result in an if-then-else 
constraint in the method body. So, the first alt box of the sequence occurs 
after the login message is received in LoginManager. The corresponding 
OCL specification of the method recLoginFromAttacker thus has an if-
then-else block around a comparison of the key received as part of the 
message and the key contained in the client certificate. Recall that the 
client certificate was replaced above by the name and key, e.g. 
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ac.certName in Figure 12. The misuse model shows Attacker replacing 
both the public key in the certificate and the public key in the message with 
its own public key; these are the values that will be checked by 
LoginManager. Variables that have been added in order to test security 
properties with Alloy Analyzer (i.e. loginAborted in our example) must be 
set appropriately in the OCL method specifications. For example, 
self.loginAborted is set to true in the abortLoginAttempt method of 
ActiveClient. 
Variables that exist in other classes are accessed via the relations shown in 
Figure 11. For example, LoginManager can test the values of the public keys by 
following the relation to the Attacker class, at1. The public key that was in the 
certificate is at1.certKey, and the public key that was just in the message is 
at1.pubKey. Methods are also accessed through relations. For example, if the 
public key test fails, LoginManager invokes at1.ac1.abortLoginAttempt in 
ActiveClient. 
Using these heuristics allowed us to develop the class diagram and OCL 
specification needed by the UML2Alloy tool, which is discussed next. 
6.4. UML2Alloy Class Diagram and OCL Input 
A portion of the security-treated misuse model class diagram used in the 
transformation from UML/OCL to Alloy is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Portion of misuse model class diagram used for UML2Alloy tool translation 
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The complete class diagram shows the types of all attributes and return types of 
methods. Figure 11 shows a portion of this diagram to illustrate its form. Since 
Alloy has no primitive types everything must be declared as a separate type, 
which will be a set in the Alloy model. Boolean types in the model (e.g. 
ResultType) are defined as an enumerated variable with the value r_true or 
r_false. The behavior of the methods is specified with the help of OCL pre- and 
post-conditions. Pre-conditions are statements that must be satisfied before the 
invocation of a method. Post-conditions are the declarative outcome of the 
method execution. The overall specification must have an entry point to be 
analyzable, so the ActiveClient class is augmented with a main() method. 
Navigation is specified with a dot (‘.’) notation, and the special name self refers to 
the context object. OCL statements return a Boolean type, so boolean return type 
operations can be invoked from within other OCL operations using the format 
object.operationcall().  
The OCL standard forbids the referencing of non-query operations from within 
an OCL statement. This is too restrictive for our approach. In order to be able to 
simulate and reason about UML models we have to extend OCL to be able to 
reference other non-query OCL specifications from within a pre- or post-
condition. To achieve this, we use Nunes’ [42] approach, which makes this 
extension to OCL and provides its formal semantics. The main benefit of the 
extension is that it makes OCL more expressive. For example, in the OCL 
statement of Figure 12, we can reference the recLoginFromAC(), which is a non-
query operation, from within the OCL specification of the main() operation. This 
enables us to simulate the model using Alloy Analyzer. 
Figure 12 shows the OCL definition of the main() method of the ActiveClient 
class. The method specifies that the recLoginFromAC() method of the Attacker 
class related to the ActiveClient, should be invoked. The rest of the methods in the 
model have similar specifications, in that they specify the values of the attributes 
of the classes, and invoke class methods. 
context ActiveClient :: main ( ) : Boolean 
-- The main operation imposes that the 
recLoginFromAC() 
-- operation will apply to all of the 
ActiveClients; they will all send a  
-- login message to LoginManager (via Attacker) 
-- The method also initializes the nonce, server 
name, and user 
-- name attributes 
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post main :  
    ActiveClient.allInstances() -> 
forAll(ac:ActiveClient |    
        ac.iNonce = INonceType::ciNonce and 
        ac.sname = NameType ::sName and 
        ac.certName = NameType ::cName and 
       ac.at.recLoginFromAC()) 
Figure 12. OCL specification of the main() method of the ActiveClient class. 
6.5. Invariants and Assertions 
Invariants must be created to constrain the Alloy model. For example, the “main” 
method of the ActiveClient must specify initialized attributes and state that the 
recLoginFromAC() operation of the Attacker has to hold for all Attackers in the 
system. This is the purpose of the OCL post-condition shown in Figure 12. 
Similarly, assertions must be created to verify the security properties of 
interest. The property discussed in Section 4.3 must be translated into an OCL 
assertion, then into an Alloy assertion for verification. Recall that this property is: 
if the TLS protocol succeeds, Attacker must not possess the same session key as 
LoginManager and ActiveClient. An OCL assertion for this property is: 
context ActiveClient 
ActiveClient.allInstances() -> 
forAll(ac:ActiveClient |  
ac.loginAborted = ResultType::r_false 
implies ( 
ac.cSessKey = SessionKeyType::symmKey and 
ac.at.lm.sessKey = SessionKeyType::symmKey 
and 
ac.at.aSessKey <> SessionKeyType::symmKey ) 
) 
6.6. Creating an Alloy Model 
This section sketches the method adopted for conducting the transformation from 
the UML to Alloy, which draws on Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [35]. This 
requires creation of a metamodel [43] of the source modeling languages i.e. the 
UML/OCL and the destination modeling language, Alloy. Then, a transformation 
is specified via rules that map model-elements of the source metamodel to a 
destination metamodel.  
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The UML and OCL metamodels have already been defined in their respective 
specifications [44, 45], which have been released by the Object Management 
Group (OMG). We are currently supporting a subset of the UML and OCL 
metamodels, as the UML metamodel is very large and includes elements that 
cannot be mapped to Alloy. We have created an Alloy metamodel from the Alloy 
grammar [30], using the methods proposed by Muller et al. [40] and Wimmer and 
Kramler [58].  
Transformation rules from UML to Alloy are explained by Bordbar and 
Anastasakis [9]. In particular, UML classes are directly translated to signatures in 
Alloy. UML associations are translated to fields of signatures. When translating 
an association, additional multiplicity facts are imposed on the Alloy fields to 
reflect the multiplicity constraints of the association ends that take part in the 
association. Class attributes are also translated to signature fields. UML types and 
enumerators are also translated to signatures. It is also important to note that 
binary bidirectional associations in UML are translated to symmetric relations in 
Alloy.    
Both OCL and Alloy are based on first-order logic. They are therefore quite 
similar, and the translation from OCL to Alloy is quite straightforward when 
dealing with first-order logic statements. As a result, the forAll OCL construct is 
translated to all in Alloy and the exists OCL construct to some in Alloy. For an 
extended study of the similarities and differences of OCL and Alloy please refer 
to Vaziri and Jackson [55]. 
All OCL statements are declared under a context, which is the element of the 
UML model on which the OCL expression is evaluated. In OCL there is a special 
name self, which refers to the context object. Alloy expressions on the other hand 
are evaluated globally. Therefore, it is essential to define the notion of context in 
Alloy models explicitly. This can be achieved by adding an object, which 
represents the context, as a parameter in the predicate to which the original OCL 
statement is translated. So, for instance, the OCL statement of Figure 12 is 
translated to the Alloy predicate of Figure 13. Translation of the rest of the 
expression items is straightforward. The complete Alloy model of the misuse 
model containing the flawed TLS-protected login sequence in the presence of a 
man-in-the-middle attack is given in the Appendix. 
pred main(){ 
all ac: ActiveClient | ((ac.iNonce = ciNonce)  
&& (ac.sname = sName)  
&& (ac.certName = cName)  
&& recLoginFromAC (ac.at))  
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} 
Figure 13. Alloy code after the translation of the main() method of the 
ActiveClient class. 
The translation rules have been implemented in a tool called UML2Alloy [18, 
19]. Figure 14 depicts the sequence of steps involved in the transformation. The 
starting point is to create a UML model of the system in a UML CASE tool such 
as ArgoUML [3]. Most UML tools, including ArgoUML, can export the UML 
model to an XMI [46] format. XMI, which stands for XML Metadata Interchange 
is an OMG standard used by UML tools to store, import and export UML models. 
UML2Alloy implements the transformation and generates an Alloy model from 
the XMI file. The Alloy model of the system can then be analyzed with the Alloy 
Analyzer [1].  
Figure 14. Process of Analysis of UML models via UML2Alloy 
6.7. Results from the Alloy Analyzer 
The first step in analysis is to simulate the model. Simulation generates a random 
instance that conforms to the whole specification, ensuring there are no 
conflicting statements.  The next step is to formulate the OCL assertions as Alloy 
assertions, capturing properties that we wish to check, as outlined above. The 
Alloy analyzer automatically checks such assertions and if they fail to produce a 
counterexample. The Alloy translation of the OCL assertion presented in section 
5.5 is: 
assert sameKeySuccess{ 
all ac:ActiveClient | ac.loginAborted = r_false 
implies 
( ac.cSessKey = symmKey &&  
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  ac.at.lm.sessKey = symmKey &&  
  ac.at.aSessKey <> symmKey ) } 
The Alloy Analyzer does not present any counterexamples to the above 
assertion, indicating that this security property is present in the TLS security-
treated system model.  
6.8. Discussion 
As explained in Section 5.1, analysis in Alloy requires selecting a scope for the 
execution, that is, putting an upper limit on the number of elements of each 
signature. The underlying idea of Alloy is to deploy automated analysis to inspire 
confidence in the correctness of the design. The larger the scope, the more 
confidence is warranted, but the longer the analysis will take [30, page 163].   
Currently, there is no clear guideline or method for identifying a suitable scope 
for analyzing an Alloy model. However, experience has shown that design flaws 
are often discovered in smaller scope. This is known as “small scope hypothesis” 
[30, Section 5.1.3]. Finding a suitable scope for each problem is a practical 
problem and is a matter of experience. 
 In this example, we initially analyzed the security-treated misuse model with a 
scope of 1 for each of the ActiveClient, Attacker and LoginManager and a scope 
of up to 8 for the rest of the model elements, to analyze the attack by a single 
Attacker. This analysis did not provide any counterexamples and returned the 
results in less than one second. To increase our confidence in the correctness of 
the design we increased the scope to sixteen for all model elements. This means 
that the Alloy Analyzer has searched for a counterexample for all combinations of 
up to sixteen clients, attackers, servers, public keys, certificate names, etc. Again 
the Analyzer did not produce a counterexample.  
Table 1 captures time required for the analysis of the model in the scope of up 
to sixteen on a server with two dual core AMD Opteron CPUs and 4GB of RAM. 
It can be seen that the time required for the analysis increases rapidly, as scope 
increases. Since there are many relations between the elements of the model, as 
the scope increases the number of possible cases the Analyzer needs to search, 
grows dramatically. With a scope of 16 the Analyzer exhaustively searches a very 
large number of cases, but still does not find a counterexample that violates our 
assertion. 
Table 1. Performance of the Alloy Analyzer 
Scope Time  Required 
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Scope of 1 for the ActiveClient, the Attacker, the 
LoginManager. Scope of 8 for the rest model elements. 
~ 1 second 
Scope of 8 for all model elements.  ~ 9 seconds 
Scope of 12 for all model elements.  ~13 seconds 
Scope of 16 for all model elements.  ~ 43 seconds 
Finally, we wish to point out that this analysis is valid only for the particular 
attack that is included in the Alloy model, i.e. man-in-the-middle. A new Alloy 
model must be created for each type of attack that needs to be checked. Of course, 
the assertions that are checked must correctly reflect how a properly protected 
system should respond to the attack. 
7. Related Work 
Recently, a lot of work appears in the areas of AOM and AOP [2, 13, 14, 31, 
34, 57]. These works are similar to ours in that they represent a view of interest, 
e.g. security, and they are cross-cutting. In AOM, this means that an aspect model 
must be integrated in several places with the primary model. In AOP, aspect code 
must be inserted into multiple components of the implementation. In both AOM 
and AOP, it is necessary to define what an aspect will do, and where this action 
should be done. Many AOP and AOM techniques use the term advice for the 
action an aspect will take and join points for where these actions will be inserted 
in the primary model. Point cuts are used to specify more general rules of where 
to apply an aspect. Often, advice, joint points, and point cuts are specified as one 
entity, called an aspect. 
There are other AOM approaches to adding security template or patterns to 
applications. Trillo and Rocha [53] describe an approach that describes security 
patterns as aspect models, and keeps them separate from the main application 
functionality throughout the design process (using AOP techniques also keeps 
them separate through implementation). Implicit in such an approach is that 
interactions between aspects will not be found since the aspects are never 
combined for analysis. If AOP techniques are used, interactions will only be 
found in the running system. Our approach composes multiple aspects with the 
primary model, so that we can analyze the entire system and identify interactions 
between security mechanisms. Such an analysis at design time is particularly 
useful when the different mechanisms interact with each other and trade-off 
decisions must be made because the properties ensured by the different 
mechanisms cannot be simultaneously enforced. 
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Other researchers have proposed languages based on UML that allows for the 
specification and analysis of system and security properties. SecureUML [6, 11] 
is one such language that specifies system and security models using an UML 
profile. Model transformations are used to generate system code from the models 
that includes a security infrastructure. The interactive theorem prover Isabelle is 
used to analyze and verify the model prior to code generation. Our work differs in 
three ways. First, SecureUML is specifically meant for access control and 
authorization properties. Our work is more generalized to check to any sort of 
security property as long as it can be expressed in first-order logic. Secondly, 
Alloy Analyzer is not a theorem prover; it does not require any user guidance to 
generate the result of the analysis. In Alloy a property is specified in first-order 
logic and the analyzer automatically tries to find an instance of the model that 
violates the property. If an instance is found, Alloy provides counterexamples that 
will help the application developer understand the flaws of the protocol. Finally, 
we are interested in security property validation in abstract specifications of 
system models and have not investigated code generation from these models. It 
might be possible to use model transformations to refine the abstract platform 
independent model to a platform specific one and partially generate code for the 
system. However this was not the initial aim of this work and remains for future 
investigation. 
   UMLsec [32] is a UML profile that allows a developer to specify security 
requirements and specifications in a system design. It has an accompanying 
toolset that allows the design to be verified as having the required security 
properties in the presence of a particular type of attacker. UMLsec provides 
several common adversary models that can be used to ensure that the system has 
the necessary security properties. Such verification can be done using a theorem 
prover such as e-SETHEO [39]. As described earlier, the approach adopted by 
Alloy, unlike theorem provers, is fully automated. For a detailed description of 
the differences between Alloy and theorem provers, please refer to Jackson [30, 
Ch.5.1.1]. Our method also differs from the UMLsec approach in that we require 
a specific misuse model to be composed with the system model prior to analysis. 
UMLsec embodies the misuse in a more generalized adversary model. 
    Researchers have also focused on the analysis of UML models. One method to 
conduct analysis of complex systems relies on formalizing the UML. Evans et al. 
[18] propose the use of Z [59] as the underlying semantics of UML models. This 
is a natural choice, as Z has been used to formally model and verify a wide variety 
of systems. However, conventional Z does not provide any support for object 
oriented constructs. Kim [36] uses Object-Z [48], an object oriented extension of 
Z, which is better suited to formalizing UML models. Kim also makes use of 
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MDA technology [36] to transform UML models to Object-Z, in order to 
facilitate analysis of the models.  
There are also a number of tools that support analysis of UML models. For 
example, the UML Specification Environment (USE) [25] is a snapshot generator. 
USE can check whether a specific instance of a UML model conforms to the OCL 
constraints of the model. This method requires the manual generation of the 
instances to be checked. Gogolla et al. [25] propose the use of a scripting 
language (ASSL), which can be used to automate the instance generation process. 
Such instances can be checked for the conformance to the model. However, 
creation of such instances is directed towards validation. On the other hand our 
approach, which makes use of the Alloy Analyzer, automatically checks the state 
space exhaustively on all possible valid instances of the model up to user 
specified scope, for a counterexample, hence resulting in verification.  
Another group of UML tools rely on theorem provers for conducting the 
analysis. For example the KeY tool [7] formalizes OCL with the help of dynamic 
logic [26] and provides an interactive theorem prover environment for the 
analysis. HOL-OCL [10] is another tool that transforms OCL to HOL formulas 
that can be analysed by the Isabelle [41] theorem prover. All these methods 
require guidance and special expertise to operate the theorem prover environment. 
Most application developers lack such expertise. On the other hand, our method 
relies on SAT-solvers and as a result the analysis if fully automated.   
Finally there are a number of UML tools, which are oriented towards checking 
the runtime conformance of an implementation. For example, the Dresden OCL 
toolkit [27] can generate  java code from UML class diagrams enriched with OCL 
constraints. The code generated checks at runtime whether the implementation 
violates any of the constraints. For an extended study of this category of tools the 
reader is referred to [12]. In contrast to such approaches, our method deals with 
the analysis of the system at an abstract level before the implementation. As a 
result our method can expose bugs and security issues of a system, early in the 
development process before the model is refined enough to be implemented and 
executed. 
  Another suitable choice of formalism for UML model is Alloy, which is 
specifically designed for Object Oriented design. As described in Section 3, our 
approach is based on using Alloy, by transforming UML class diagrams and OCL 
into Alloy models. Massoni et al. [37] also transform UML Class diagrams to 
Alloy in order to analyze structural properties of UML models. However, their 
work is mainly focused on static aspects and, unlike our method, does not deal 
with the dynamics of UML models.  
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Mostefaoui and Vachon [38] also use Alloy to analyze behavioral interactions 
of aspect-oriented models. Base behavior is transformed into an Alloy model 
along with joint points, point cut specifications, and aspect behavioral advice. 
Alloy analyzer is used to verify the presence of the required base behavior, in 
addition to aspect behavior. The technique was developed to identify interactions 
or conflicts between multiple aspects being applied to a base behavior at the same 
time. Aspects in this work related to additional features being added to a base 
system. The multiple aspects are composed into a single Alloy entity and then 
woven with the base behavior before, after, or both before and after the join point. 
Our work differs in that composing a security-treated system model with different 
attack models prior to transformation and analysis provides assurance that the 
system design is resilient to particular forms of attack identified through risk 
analysis. Also, the work we describe provides a methodology for designing secure 
applications, and the use of Alloy to analyze for security issues is just one part 
(albeit a crucial one) of the overall methodology.  
A number of protocols and systems have been modeled and analyzed in Alloy. 
The COM architecture [29] and the consistency of the International Naming 
Scheme (INS) [33] are two of them. There are also a number of systems originally 
modeled in UML, which have been manually transformed to Alloy for the 
purpose of analysis. Alloy has also been used for partially analyzing the run-time 
configuration management of an Asynchronous Transfer Mode/Internet Protocol 
(ATM/IP) Network Monitoring System [21]. Dennis et al [16] have used Alloy to 
analyze a radiation therapy machine, exposing major flaws in the original UML 
design of the system. Unlike these case studies, our work supports fully 
automated transformation of UML models enriched with OCL constraints, to 
Alloy, for the purpose of analysis. 
Vela et al. [56] focus on model driven development of secure XML databases. 
Specifically, the authors address authorization and audit properties. While they 
use model transformations to convert a platform independent model to a platform 
specific one, our approach is using model transformation to create formalism for 
analysis. Unlike our work, they do not apply any analysis techniques on the UML 
design of the system.   
The idea of using aspects for designing secure systems has been presented in 
our earlier works [22, 23, 24]. In our very early work [22, 24] we developed the 
concepts needed to specify and compose security aspects with a primary model. 
At that time we utilized UML1.4 static class diagrams and UML dynamic 
collaboration diagrams to specify behavior. Other work in our group [19, 20, 50)] 
provided formal notations (using newer versions of UML), specifications, and 
composition algorithms that we rely on in the research presented in this paper. In 
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our later paper [23], we outlined the steps needed to verify security properties 
(embodied in an aspect) after composition with a primary design model. The 
analysis was informal and done manually. Although informal analysis is easy to 
perform and requires fewer resources, it cannot give adequate assurances 
especially for complex systems. The work presented in this paper extends the 
earlier work by showing how a real-world complex system can be formally 
analyzed to ensure that a given attack does not compromise the system resources. 
The formal analysis done in this paper is automated and ensures that problems 
have not been overlooked. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a methodology for developing secure systems that are 
resilient to given attacks. We first perform risk assessments to identify the types 
of attacks that are typical for such applications. We show how to evaluate the 
application against such attacks. If the results of this evaluation indicate that the 
assets may be compromised, then some security mechanism must be incorporated 
into the application. The resulting system is then formally analyzed to ensure that 
it is indeed resilient to the given attack. We validated our approach on a real-
world e-commerce application.  
        Our approach does not detect new vulnerabilities but it can be used for 
assessing whether a given vulnerability poses sufficient risk that necessitates its 
mitigation. The main benefit of our approach is that it simplifies the design of 
complex systems. The primary models and the aspects can be analyzed in 
isolation to ensure that individually they satisfy the functional and security 
properties respectively. The models can be composed and the analysis of the 
composed model will give assurance that the resulting system also satisfies the 
properties. Another benefit of our approach is that it allows one to experiment 
with various security mechanisms to see which one is most suitable for preventing 
a given attack on the application.  When a system is required to enforce different 
security properties, multiple aspects must be integrated with the application. This 
will allow one to study and formalize the interaction between aspects.   
Our on-going and future work concentrates efforts in three areas. We are in the 
process of developing detailed algorithms to support the abstraction of complex 
UML diagrams and their conversion to OCL specifications, so that the approach 
can be automated. This ability will aid developers using the approach by reducing 
the chances that simplifying abstractions made by the developer leave out crucial 
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items for the analysis. We are also investigating the broader applicability of the 
approach to other security mechanisms that are more appropriately specified by 
UML diagrams other than sequence diagrams.  Finally, we are also investigating 
application of the approach to other stages in the development lifecycle of 
complex software systems, especially to the requirements phase. 
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Appendix – Alloy Model and Assertions 
module FixedTLSMisuseModel 
 
sig ActiveClient{ 
at: Attacker, 
iNonce: INonceType, 
reciNonce: INonceType, 
sname: NameType, 
certName: NameType, 
recName: NameType, 
cSessKey: SessionKeyType, 
msg: EncrMessType, 
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loginAborted: ResultType, 
resultPage: PageType,  
cPubKey: PublicKeyType,  
recPubKey: PublicKeyType } 
 
sig Attacker{ 
ac1: ActiveClient, 
lm: LoginManager, 
aSessKey: SessionKeyType, 
pubKey: PublicKeyType, 
certKey: PublicKeyType, 
certName: NameType, 
loginAborted: ResultType, 
resultPage: PageType } 
 
sig LoginManager{ 
at1: Attacker, 
upm: UProfileManager, 
sessKey: SessionKeyType, 
certName: NameType, 
recInonce: INonceType, 
name: NameType, 
cKey: PublicKeyType, 
cCertKey: PublicKeyType, 
prof: ProfileType, 
msg: EncrMessType, 
resultPage: PageType } 
 
sig UProfileManager{ 
lm1: LoginManager, 
name: NameType, 
prof: ProfileType } 
 
abstract sig ResultType { } 
one sig r_true extends ResultType {} 
one sig r_false extends ResultType {} 
 
abstract sig SessionKeyType { } 
one sig symmKey extends SessionKeyType {} 
one sig nullKey extends SessionKeyType {} 
 
abstract sig EncrMessType { } 
one sig encrCont extends EncrMessType {} 
one sig nullMess extends EncrMessType {} 
 
abstract sig INonceType { } 
one sig cINonce extends INonceType {} 
one sig nullNonce extends INonceType {} 
   Page 53  
 
abstract sig PageType { } 
one sig homePage extends PageType {} 
one sig visitorPage extends PageType {} 
one sig nullPage extends PageType {} 
 
abstract sig NameType { } 
one sig sName extends NameType {} 
one sig aName extends NameType {} 
one sig cName extends NameType {} 
 
abstract sig PublicKeyType { } 
one sig aPublicKey extends PublicKeyType {} 
one sig cPublicKey extends PublicKeyType {} 
 
abstract sig ProfileType { } 
one sig cProfile extends ProfileType {} 
one sig nullProfile extends ProfileType {} 
 
fact ac1_at { ac1 = ~at }  
fact at1_lm { at1 = ~lm }  
fact lm1_upm { lm1 = ~upm }  
 
fact {My11To11(at ,ActiveClient ,Attacker)} 
fact {My11To11(ac1 ,Attacker ,ActiveClient)} 
fact {My11To11(lm ,Attacker ,LoginManager)} 
fact {My11To11(at1 ,LoginManager ,Attacker)} 
fact {My11To11(upm ,LoginManager, UProfileManager)} 
fact {My11To11(lm1 , UProfileManager, LoginManager)} 
 
pred My11To11(r:univ -> univ, t: set univ, u: set univ){ 
all x:t|one y:u|x.r=y 
all y:u|one x:t| x.r=y } 
 
pred main(){ 
all ac: ActiveClient | ac.iNonce = cINonce && 
ac.sname = sName &&  
ac.cPubKey = cPublicKey && 
ac.certName = cName && 
recLoginFromAC(ac.at)   } 
 
 
pred recContLFromAttacker(ac': ActiveClient){ 
ac'.recName = ac'.at.lm.certName &&  
((ac'.recName != ac'.sname) => 
   abortLoginAttempt(ac') 
 else( 
    ac'.reciNonce = ac'.at.lm.recInonce && 
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    ((ac'.reciNonce != ac'.iNonce) =>  
      abortLoginAttempt(ac') 
     else( 
        ac'.recPubKey  =  ac'.at.lm.cKey  && 
        ((ac'.recPubKey != ac'.cPubKey) => 
         abortLoginAttempt(ac') 
       else( 
          ac'.cSessKey  =  ac'.at.aSessKey  && 
          ac'.msg  =  encrCont  && 
          recMsgFromAC(ac'.at.lm)))))))} 
 
pred abortLoginAttempt(ac': ActiveClient){ 
ac'.loginAborted = r_true && 
ac'.resultPage = nullPage && 
ac'.at.loginAborted = r_true && 
ac'.at.resultPage = nullPage } 
 
pred recResFromAttacker(ac': ActiveClient){ 
ac'.resultPage = ac'.at.lm.resultPage && 
ac'.loginAborted = r_false } 
 
pred recLoginFromAC(at': Attacker){ 
at'.pubKey = aPublicKey && 
at'.certKey = aPublicKey && 
at'.certName = at'.ac1.certName && 
recLoginFromAttacker(at'.lm) } 
 
pred recContLFromLM(at': Attacker){ 
at'.aSessKey = at'.lm.sessKey && 
recContLFromAttacker(at'.ac1) } 
 
pred recResFromLM(at': Attacker){ 
( 
  (at'.lm.cKey = aPublicKey) => 
    (at'.loginAborted = r_false && 
    at'.resultPage = at'.lm.resultPage ) 
 else  ( 
    at'.loginAborted = r_false && 
  at'.resultPage = nullPage ))&& 
recResFromAttacker(at'.ac1)} 
 
pred recLoginFromAttacker(lm': LoginManager){ 
lm'.certName = sName && 
lm'.recInonce = lm'.at1.ac1.iNonce && 
lm'.name = lm'.at1.certName  && 
lm'.cKey = lm'.at1.pubKey && 
lm'.cCertKey = lm'.at1.certKey && 
((lm'.cKey != lm'.cCertKey) => 
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   abortLoginAttempt(lm'.at1.ac1) 
 else( 
      lm'.sessKey = symmKey && 
     recContLFromLM(lm'.at1)))} 
 
pred recMsgFromAC(lm': LoginManager){ 
lm'.msg = lm'.at1.ac1.msg && 
((lm'.msg = encrCont) => 
   getProfile(lm'.upm) 
 else 
   abortLoginAttempt(lm'.at1.ac1))} 
 
pred sendResult(lm': LoginManager){ 
lm'.prof = lm'.upm.prof && 
((lm'.prof = cProfile) =>  
    lm'.resultPage = homePage  
 else 
    lm'.resultPage = visitorPage ) && 
recResFromLM(lm'.at1) } 
 
pred getProfile(upm': UProfileManager){ 
upm'.name = upm'.lm1.name && 
((upm'.name = cName) => 
    upm'.prof = cProfile 
 else 
    upm'.prof = nullProfile ) && 
sendResult(upm'.lm1) } 
 
pred exec(){ 
main() && 
some Attacker && 
some UProfileManager && 
some LoginManager && 
some ActiveClient } 
 
fact{exec()} 
 
assert noLogin{ 
all ac:ActiveClient | ac.loginAborted = r_true 
} 
 
assert assert1{ 
all ac:ActiveClient |  
((ac.loginAborted = r_false) =>  
    (ac.cSessKey = symmKey && 
      ac.at.lm.sessKey = symmKey && 
      ac.at.aSessKey != symmKey ))} 
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assert assert2{ 
all ac:ActiveClient |  
((ac.loginAborted = r_true) =>  
    (ac.resultPage = nullPage && 
      ac.at.resultPage = nullPage))} 
 
assert assert3{ 
all ac:ActiveClient |  
((ac.loginAborted = r_false) =>  
    ((ac.resultPage = homePage || 
    ac.resultPage = visitorPage) && 
    ac.at.resultPage = nullPage ))} 
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